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By way of introduction to the four papers that follow, we chart some key parameters of debate 
about finance and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In particular, we argue that the rise of 
discourses about “predatory lending” and “debt trap” (that feature in much commentary and 
reportage about BRI) merits critique and contextualization. The financing needs of BRI also 
raises important implications for the geography of financial markets and business services in 
Asia and other key locations in global financial networks. The networked nature of financial 
centres and the vital role of advanced business services brings into view actors, sites and spaces 
(such as law firms and offshore centres) that have been neglected by the geopolitical lenses 
most often applied to analysing BRI.  
 














Of loans and debts  
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was first proclaimed in 2013 as a future-oriented project 
connecting Eurasia, but one that mobilises imaginations of historical linkages, notably the idea 
of Silk Roads (Sidaway et al. 2020; Winter 2019). There has been a proliferation of debate and 
interest in BRI projects and impacts across Eurasia and beyond. A quick search yields hundreds 
of scholarly articles, reams of media commentary and dozens of books. In Joniak-Lüthi’s 
(2020, 1) words,  
“Since the plan was announced, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the connectivity it promises have 
attracted huge international attention. That promise of new connectivity, and the nearly magical powers 
ascribed to transport infrastructure to generate peace and prosperity, and to unite the states and people along 
the Economic Belt, are at the very core of the Chinese discourse around it.” 
 
However, scholarship on BRI’s financial dimensions is sparser. The four papers that follow 
address different aspects of finance and BRI.  This special section is interested in, inter alia, 
where does the money associated with BRI come from? How could we conceptualize BRI 
within wider circuits of capital, consumption, and crisis? What is the relationship of financing 
BRI to other financial flows, centres, institutions, infrastructures, and debt? How does 
financing BRI balance China's aspirations and visions with its overseas commitment and 
challenges?  
Questions about finance and China’s wider trajectory and impacts have long been discussed 
within accounts of China’s post-1978 shifting engagement with the global economy, especially 
its relationship with the United States (Hung 2009) and the advent of the China-led Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015 (Cai 2018; Knoerich and Urdinez 2019; Yang and Van 
Gorp; Yu 2017). These issues came into sharper relief after the Trump administration launched 
a trade war with China in 2018. This continued, albeit with some relaxations, through 2019.  
 
More widely however, a narrative about how BRI embodies wider Chinese “predatory lending” 
- whereby geoeconomic power is harnessed for geopolitical ends - has become common. In a 
public letter (dated 3 August 2018, addressed to the US Secretary of State for the Treasury and 
the US Secretary of State), about the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Edwin M Truman 
(2018), former assistant secretary of the US Treasury for International Affairs and 15 other US 
Senators, expressed concerns over Chinese lending.  The letter described how “Beijing’s 
attempt to weaponize its capital is not just limited to Asia and Africa but extends to Europe” 
citing Chinese loans, which are likely to lead to default, for Balkan port and highway projects. 
The term ‘weaponize’ clearly situated China’s lending as an insidious tool and the letter posed 
a series of striking questions about China’s intentions. There was a particular focus on the then 
pending IMF bailout of Pakistan, which was said to be necessary due to debt obligations that 
Pakistan had incurred on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship BRI project 
(United States Senate 2018, 2): 
• How do you plan to raise the dangers of Chinese infrastructure financing through BRI with the 
IMF? 
• Do you believe that additional countries will ask for a bailout from the IMF due to BRI? Which 
countries? 
• As the largest contributor to the IMF, how can the United States use its influence to ensure that 
bailout terms prevent the continuation of ongoing BRI projects, or the start of new BRI projects? 
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• How can the United States work with allies and partners to educate countries about the risks of 
Chinese infrastructure loans? 
• How can the United States work with allies and partners to assist countries struggling to repay debts 
due to BRI? 
• How can the United States work with allies and partners to present an alternative to developing 
nations regarding investment and infrastructure funding? 
 
The Senators’ claims have been echoed by Vice-President Pence as part of an extensive 
discourse about BRI as a “debt trap”. The following year saw the Executive Board of the IMF 
approved a 39-month extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for 
Pakistan for an amount of Special Drawing Right (SDR) 4,268 million (about US$6 billion or 
210 percent of quota) to support the country’s economic reform program (IMF 2019).  
Debt trap discourses have also featured in political cartoons, further provoking controversy. 
Political cartoonist Wang Liming, under the pseudonym of Rebel Pepper, depicts BRI as a 
spider’s web that has placed Laos, Sri Lanka and the Maldives in cocoons and entrapped 
Cambodia and Malaysia (see Figure 1). Rebel Pepper’s cartoon expresses what Deborah 
Brautigam (2019, 1) calls the “meme” of debt-trap diplomacy. She traced its origins to India 
and subsequent circulation in the United States, noting that: 
A meme is an idea that spreads from person to person within a culture, often with the aim of conveying a 
particular phenomenon, theme or meaning. On 23 January 2017, a Chinese debt-trap diplomacy meme was 
born in a think tank in northern India and was furthered by a paper written by two Harvard University 
graduate students who called it Chinese ‘debt book diplomacy’. The student paper was enthusiastically cited 
by The Guardian and The New York Times and other major media outlets as academic proof of China’s 
nefarious intentions. The meme began to take deep root in Washington, DC, and ricocheted beyond Delhi 
to Japan, all along the Beltway and again into The New York Times and beyond. Later, it was amplified, it 
was thundered by a US Secretary of State, it walked quietly into intelligence circles, it hovered in the US 
Congress and it settled in the Pentagon. All these people became very worried about this idea, about this 
meme. By November 2018, a Google web search generated 1,990,000 results in 0.52 seconds. It was 
beginning to solidify as firm conventional wisdom and to be accepted as a deep historical truth. 
 
Symptomatic of the dissemination of the meme, a recent paper about the potential of remotely 
sensed night-time light images to inform analysis of BRI argues that “In relation to capital 
flows, remote sensing can help corroborate whether Chinese aid is guilty of “debt-trap 
diplomacy”” (Bennett 2019, 6). Whilst some outcomes of uneven development may be legible 
from space (but is the complex social relation that is debt?), there are good reasons to doubt 
that lending related to BRI constitutes a “debt-trap”. Indeed, a longer time horizon might more 
usefully apply that term to the lead-up to and aftermaths of the 2007 financial crisis (French, 
Leyshon and Thrift 2009; Wyly et al. 2007). The crisis yielded a decade of austerity in the most 
impacted countries, as banks who had engaged in predatory lending and rolled these debts into 
“derivatives” (then touted as “investments”) had to be bailed out with public funds (Hendrikse 
and Sidaway, 2014). Likewise, arguably, the early 1980s “Third World debt crisis”, became a 
debt-trap, following a decade in which a number of Eastern European socialist countries and 
selected governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America borrowed heavily from Western and 
Japanese banks in the 1970s, on terms that seemed too good to refuse (George 1988; Saddy 
1982). Following recession and interest rate hikes in the 1980s, they could no longer pay the 
interest and started to default on the loans; this yielded structural adjustment, accompanying a 
shift to neoliberal agendas as defined by the Bretton Woods institutions (Mohan et al., 2000). 
The Washington consensus emerged, emphasizing markets and openness. In Asia, criticisms 
of such neoliberal agendas and the Wall-Street-Treasury-IMF Complex become prominent 
during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, when austerity programmes and ‘fire sales’ of state-
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owned companies and assets were imposed as part of IMF loan conditionalities on the crisis-
laden economies of Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea (Bhagwati 1998; Wade 1998; Wade 
and Veneroso 1998). China largely escaped unscathed from that financial crisis due to capital 
controls and limited loans in foreign currencies. Although China increasingly participated in 
liberalized trade regimes since the 1980s, it did so without significant international borrowing. 
In fact, by 2003, China became a net creditor (Chin and Helleiner 2008) and surpassed Japan 
as the largest foreign holder of US debt in 2008 (Sharma 2010).  
The labelling and interpretation of “financial” crises is political. Alternative labels embody 
different interpretations and envision different solutions (Kelly 2001; Sidaway 2008). Concern 
about China and debt might more gainfully focus on the scale of household and corporate debt 
within China and Chinese exposures to loans and risks to Chinese banks and firms of 
international investments turning bad, rather than a putative BRI debt-trap. Discourses about 
debt require wider applications over longer historical periods than many current debates 
regarding China and BRI financing. Critical interpretations of the nature and impacts of 
Chinese BRI financing, debt and developmental outcomes are constrained by collapsing BRI 
financing into a debt-trap discourse. It bears noting, however, that BRI itself is less coherent 
on the ground than the grand proclamations of binding Eurasia into a single China focused 
geoeconomic space might lead us to believe. The journalist Sebastian Strangio (2020 6) notes 
how: 
…the BRI has frayed on the implementation end. In reality, it has devolved into a kind of catch-all: a 
unifying rubric for the full spectrum of China’s global endeavours, from Confucius Institutes to a high-speed 
rail. Six years on, the BRI is still more a ‘Chinese Dream’ than a China plan”, according to Bilahari 
Kausikan, an outspoken veteran of Singapore’s diplomatic corps. 
 
Therefore, both BRI itself as well as its fiscal underpinnings and impacts hugely vary. They 
defy easy generalizations, generating financial patterns and solutions as they proceed. 
Reminding us of the lessons imparted in a 101-level Macroeconomics class, one of the more 
balanced considerations of the debt implications of BRI notes that: “Public borrowing to 
support productive investment is central to the development narratives of today’s wealthy 
countries and it continues to drive growth in emerging economies.” (Hurley et al. 2018, 3). The 
grounded dynamics matter – does the investment yield productivity, who benefits, where and 
on what terms? These are complex questions and the papers that follow open pathways to 
consider them, from scholars researching or based in the economies and territories configured 
by BRI’s commercial and geopolitical dynamics.  
 
 








Articles in this special section 
The four papers that follow were first presented in mid-September 2019, at the first Global 
Conference of the Global Network on Financial Geography (FinGeo) held at Beijing Normal 
University. The conference session thereby brought together our research interests on the 
genealogy and representation of BRI (Lin et al. 2019; Sidaway and Woon 2017) and new 
financial geographies of Asian economies and financial centres (Lai 2011; 2012; Lai et al. 
2020). To understand the dynamic and variegated landscapes of global finance, it is insufficient 
to focus on economic factors or cultural explanations; geopolitical interests are also vital in 
shaping the creation of new markets and financial flows. The rise of Asian finance and the 
distinctive roles of state actors in Asian economies has prompted renewed interest in political 
economic analysis and explanations in addition to a cultural economy approach to finance and 
market making (Hall 2020; Lai and Samers 2017). Given the venue of the conference in 
Beijing, the growing financial power of Chinese firms and institutions through BRI and 
renminbi (RMB) internationalisation were particularly topical for this first global conference 
on financial geography. We were keen to foster discussion on the value of intersecting finance 
with geopolitical considerations in order to explain how global financial networks and 
developmental outcomes unfold. The papers by Michael Dunford, Simon Rowedder and Tim 
Summers were presented in a session on “Financing the Belt and Road Initiative”. The paper 
by Weidong Liu, Yajing Zhang and Wei Xiong draws upon a plenary lecture given by Weidong 
Lui that preceded the session.  
Dunford (2020) sets the stage, with a historical take on the Chinese model of foreign aid along 
with the western-dominated architecture of development through the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
uncovering their differences in aims, principles and practice. He argues that China aims to 
make recipient countries more self-reliant (自力更生) reflecting its own experience of semi-
colonial rule. This differs from DAC donors’ tendency to develop country assistance strategies 
that predominantly reflect donor goals. He also stresses caution on claims that China engages 
in debt-trap diplomacy through its aid via BRI projects, echoing Brautigam’s (2019) call to 
look at foreign aid and debt of the recipient country through a longer historical perspective. 
Dunford further notes that China’s BRI’s activities and the establishment of the China 
International Development Cooperation Agency signal aspirations to compete with the 
Western order rather just complement it, although as we note in a moment, Tim Summer’s 
paper identifies structural limits to the scope of China’s challenge. 
Liu, Zhang and Xiong’s (2020) contribution, “Financing the Belt and Road Initiative” builds 
on what Dunford has highlighted about China’s development model, in a contemporary 
context. They highlight the financial resources that China has mobilized in support of BRI and 
identify five types of these in China supporting BRI construction, namely pure aid, preferential 
loans, development finance, commercial loans and various special funds. Among the five types, 
development finance and special funds are particularly important for BRI infrastructure 
development and connectivity projects. They argue that geographical studies of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) need to consider financing issues, and BRI and its financing models present 
valuable opportunities for geographers to examine BRI’s political and economic dynamics. 
They further stress that given cultural and institutional differences between China and its BRI 
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partners, the importance of developing good financing practices in Belt and Road construction 
may require time and learning through the experience of multi-lateral development financial 
institutions in different countries. 
In his account of “Structural power and the financing of the BRI”, Tim Summers (2020) 
situates the financing of BRI within the broader debates of the extent of China’s revisionist 
intentions and capacities. Summers argues that the implementation of BRI is checked by 
structural power in the global political economy. He raises the constraints posed by US Dollar 
financing, and China’s limited capacity to do RMB financing due to capital controls. He asks 
how novel is Chinese BRI financing, and how far it is based on established international 
standards and models, despite rhetorical claims to the contrary? Summers joins an evolving 
discussion on the degree of systemic contestation or convergence from Chinese development 
finance (Chin and Gallagher 2019).  
The final paper by Simon Rowedder (2019) illustrates BRI financing and its impacts on local 
communities with a case study of high-speed rail (HSR) development in Laos, examining 
BRI’s spatial outreach in terms of (re)developing transport networks. Rowedder offers a bottom 
up view of local sentiments of HSR and shows the frustration of the locals with very limited 
direct benefits and the rise of Chinese enclaves in northern Laos. These sentiments and impacts 
are embedded in wider geopolitical and economic backdrops of BRI in Southeast Asia (SEA) 
(Gong 2019; Kuok 2019), and pre-existing Chinese roles in Laos and other parts of mainland 
SEA. He examines the spatial logic of Chinese development and the HSR financing, and 
juxtaposes the financial mechanism of the railway project and the different temporal and spatial 
scales of Laos' and China’s calculations of potential benefits.  
 
Agendas 
As BRI approaches its tenth birthday in 2023, its financing mechanisms are important concerns 
for China and partner countries. During the 2020s, BRI will face numerous challenges in light 
of international and domestic scrutiny and the twists and turns of US-China relations, as well 
as the path of China’s relations with leading US allies, notably Australia and Japan, and with 
India; where sceptical commentary on BRI as debt-trap originated. The question of the 
boundaries of BRI currently looms large, with all Chinese investment in some places 
discursively linked with BRI, whatever the specific rationale, nature and context of the 
investment. As Michael Dwyer (2020, 1) has argued, “the BRI is more an effort to marshal a 
variety of existing initiatives under a single grand narrative associated with the leadership of 
Xi Jinping than it is a de novo plan.” Similarly, Alessandro Rippa (2020, 2, italics in the 
original) judges BRI: 
“as a fundamentally un-coherent strategy, one characterized by centripetal tendencies and uncoordinated 
efforts.  Thus to say that a particular project is part of the BRI says little about its aims, financial foundations, 
and structure.”  
 
Sihanoukville in Cambodia serves as one example, with private commercial capital 
transforming the coastal city into the “next Macau” of South East Asia and casinos sprouting 
rapidly, raising concerns whether this is sustainable and who benefits (see, for example, Huang 




“policy-makers and practitioners elsewhere must develop a capacity to analyse power relations at the level 
of individual projects, as well as ways of engaging actors, whether in China or recipient states, with the 
power to exert pressure for better governance standards.” 
 
Rowedder’s article in this special section illustrates such a need, which is certainly the case for 
many other sites under the BRI’s radar as well. There have been, however, some key indications 
that such concerns are duly noted. In January 2019, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
was signed by the Singapore International Mediation Centre and the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade to offer mediation services to resolve disputes related to the 
BRI. It is reported that the two organisations will jointly develop a BRI mediator panel 
comprising mediation professionals from China, Singapore and BRI partner countries who will 
familiarise themselves with the various jurisdictions and enforcement procedures to handle 
dispute cases (Iwamoto 2019; Tan 2019). Additionally, the recent signing of the UN’s 
Singapore Convention on Mediation to assist international trade and promote mediation as an 
“alternative and effective method” of resolving trade disputes saw China as one of the first 
states to sign it and offer BRI disputes a key avenue to be settled efficiently (Love 2019). More 
widely, Singapore presents itself as a key financial centre for BRI, citing its position as a global 
financial centre and one of the largest offshore RMB centres in the world,   
 “It is crucial that Singapore leverages its strengths as a global centre of trade, finance and talent as well as 
its geographical proximity and strong ties with China and Southeast Asia to tap growth opportunities arising 
from the Belt & Road trade routes.” (Ernest Kan, Deputy Managing Partner, Deloitte Singapore, cited in 
Yap 2018) 
 
Xinhua News Agency, the official state-run press agency of the China also reported in an 
interview with Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, where he shared his thoughts on 
the future of Sino-Singapore relations, 
“According to Chinese statistics, we are your biggest foreign investor. We are also a major destination for 
Chinese investments out of China, into the Belt and Road region. In fact, we account for, I think, one quarter 
of your investments for the whole of the Belt and Road partner countries. So, the economic ties have grown 
tremendously, and the basis of this has been, of course, China’s reform and opening up, and our assessment 
and perspective that this has been a tremendous boon to China and the world. Therefore, where possible, 
Singapore will participate in this and make a modest contribution to help the process. And in the process, 
we also hope to benefit from China’s development and progress.” (Lee, cited in Prime Minister’s Office 
Singapore’s transcript, 2019) 
 
Singapore seeks to become a financial node within BRI networks, establishing links that 
connect with, but also transcend, those depicted in the many maps of BRI (such as Figure 2). 
In terms of the city-state’s aspirations at another investment frontier, Singapore seems to be 
“living up to its quest to view the world as its hinterland” (Bennett 2018, 289-290). This 
emphasis on hinterland and wider networks draws our attention towards other centres and 
dynamics connected to, although not necessarily at the core of, BRI maps and debates. The 
financial geography literature has demonstrated the ways in which financial actors and strategic 
places intermediate in the control and coordination of capital flows and in the configuration of 
production in the global economy (Bassens and van Meeteren 2015; Coe et al 2014). Other 
than specific characteristics and locational advantages of particular financial centres or capital 
markets, they also accrue power and influence through their relations with other financial 




***Insert Figure 2 here*** 
 
China’s ability to finance BRI has come under increasing pressure, not least because of the 
scale of the projects, but also due to the slowing down of its economy since 2015 and the wider 
problems of non-performing loans in Chinese banks, which have been the largest lenders in 
BRI so far (Bloomberg News 2019; Zhou 2019). In seeking to diversifying funding sources, 
the financing needs of BRI is creating new financial markets and networks. Kazakhstan, for 
example, has invested in the establishment of Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC). 
The AIFC envisages: “a pivotal role in positioning itself as a global centre for business and 
finance, connecting the economies of the Central Asia, the Caucasus, EAEU [Eurasian 
Economic Union, comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia] and, West China, Mongolia, 
Middle East and Europe” (https://aifc.kz, accessed 25 January 2020). Formulated as a platform 
to create joint ventures and special purpose vehicles, the AIFC is seeking to attract a range of 
financial market players, such as family offices, wealth managers, securities traders and 
financial technology firms; targeted as potential investors in BRI projects through their global 
financial networks to institutional and retail investors elsewhere. Such endeavours necessarily 
draw upon capital and institutional expertise of various financial actors from across the world. 
For instance, the new Astana International Exchange (AIX) is backed by Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, the Chinese state-run Silk Road Fund, US investment bank Goldman Sachs and 
stock exchange Nasdaq, all of which own shares in AIFC and/or AIX (Lee 2019).  
Amidst uncertainties regarding the sustainability of such new stock exchanges and financial 
centres, existing financial centres have been quick to plug in to BRI opportunities. 
Unsurprisingly, Hong Kong has become a significant hub in facilitating external financing. As 
a major offshore centre and the gateway to global capital for China, Hong Kong offers deep 
capital markets for funding opportunities and a large banking sector with access to a wide range 
of international banks. Recent regulatory support includes easing the listing conditions for 
firms linked to BRI, the establishment of the Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office 
(IFFO) to support investors into BRI projects and funding vehicles (Garcia-Herrero 2017). As 
a global financial hub, London has played an active role in various forms of financial support 
to BRI projects, such as through raising equity, debt financing, integrated financial services 
and expert advice from key players like Standard Chartered, Linklaters, Clifford Chance, the 
London Stock Exchange Group and UK Export Finance. Plans include joint efforts at setting 
up equity funds from London to invest in BRI projects, bond issuance, brokering public-private 
partnerships, promoting derivatives for diversification, and hedging (City of London 2018). 
London is also expanding its financial centre capacities relating to BRI activities and wider 
business opportunities from Asian firms. In addition to the City of London and Canary Wharf, 
the redevelopment of the Royal Albert Dock in East London envisions London’s third business 
and financial district, with a BRI focus (South China Morning Post 2018; Naderi 2019). The 
revitalised Royal Albert Dock, which some have dubbed Asian Business Port, will serve as an 
international platform for Chinese companies and investors to enter the British and European 
markets, although enthusiasm for the project has dampened recently with uncertainty around 
the outcomes of Brexit (Clarence-Smith 2019). These economic and urban developments 
connected to financial centre growth point to the rise of new configurations in established cities, 
demanding just as much critical scholarly attention as BRI projects in new and emerging 
regions and economies.  
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In addition to banking and financial capacities, legal expertise is vital to BRI projects. Whether 
it is cross-border lending, bond issuance, listing on stock exchanges or entering into joint 
development projects, legal contracts are fundamental to the conduct of these economic 
activities and legal services are vital in shaping the internationalisation process. Where such 
legal expertise comes from and to whom firms and state entities turn to for legal advice and 
arbitration may strengthen the market power of established law firms and financial centres or 
lead to the development of new centres of expertise. Singapore, for instance, has been 
developing itself as a global arbitration centre in recent years; it is currently the most preferred 
centre for international arbitration in Asia and third in the world (after London and Paris) 
(Singapore International Arbitration Centre 2018). Many of the arbitrations do not involve 
Singapore entities and point to the role of Singapore as a neutral venue (less viable now for 
Hong Kong) for the resolution of international commercial disputes. The reputation of 
Singapore’s courts and legal system for competence, integrity and skills when there is a need 
for any dispute resolution arising from BRI, Asian trade cooperation, or other investments 
between Chinese and Southeast Asian companies and entities is being promoted by Singapore’s 
government (The Straits Times 2019). In this context, Singapore-based law firms are 
strategically positioned in shaping corporate activities (Faulconbridge 2019). Given the vital 
role of legal service and other advanced business services for financial centre capacity and their 
networked power (Wójcik 2013b), the development of legal services and expertise plays a 
crucial role in the financing of BRI and its impacts on broader networks of capital and 
knowledge.  
Scholarly attention on an evolving BRI and its financing needs to transcend the ‘debt-trap’ 
meme. As David Harvey (1982, 324) signalled in a landmark discussion of finance capital and 
the state: 
“The state is both controlled and controlling in relation to the circulation of capital. Which force dominates 
depends upon circumstance. But there, as elsewhere, the disequilibria have to be conceived of as perpetual 
oscillations around a moving point of equilibrium between countervailing forces… the relation between 
finance capital (however conceived) and the state is founded on a contradiction within a unity. Any analysis 
of the state and of power relations between states must understand the nature and origin of the contradictions 
and place that understanding at the very centre of its concern.”   
 
BRI’s roles in such oscillations, (dis)equilibria and contradictions offer challenging objects for 
analysis. Inevitably, they will be moving targets. Their framing already encompasses a wide 
range of discourses, from debt-trap to “game changer” and “much ado about nothing” (Yang 
and Van Gorp 2019). Simultaneously, the networked nature of financial centres and the vital 
role of advanced business services (e.g. law and accounting) brings agents and sites into view 
(such as law firms, financial regulators and offshore centres), that are generally less visible in 
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